Portland State University

PDXScholar
Systems Science Faculty Publications and
Presentations

Systems Science

Fall 10-28-2022

Speculative Realism and Systems Metaphysics
Martin Zwick
Portland State University, zwick@pdx.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/sysc_fac
Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, Metaphysics Commons, and the Philosophy of Science
Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Citation Details
Zwick, Martin (2022). "Speculative Realism and Systems Metaphysics." Northwest Philosophy
Conference, Lewis and Clark College, Portland Oregon, Oct 28-29, 2022.

This Presentation is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Systems
Science Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if
we can make this document more accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

NORTHWEST PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE
Lewis & Clark College, Portland, Oregon, October 28-29, 2022

(1) Word count: 3020 main + 145 footnotes = 3165 words
(2) Author: Martin Zwick
(3) Academic status: Professor
(4) Institutional affiliation: Systems Science Program, Portland State University
(5) Mailing address: P.O. Box 751, Portland OR 97207-0751
(6) Email address: zwick@pdx.edu
(7) Telephone number: 503-725-4987
(8) Title: Speculative Realism and Systems Metaphysics
(9) Abstract: 100 words

Abstract
Recent developments in Continental philosophy have included emergence of a school of
“speculative realism” which rejects the human-centered orientation that has long dominated
Continental thought, but also opposes naïve realism or positivism. Proponents of speculative
realism differ on several issues, but most agree on the need for an object-oriented ontology.
Several thinkers retain a focus on difference, a well-established theme in Continental thought.
This paper looks at speculative realism from the perspective of the metaphysics of systems
theory. Many of the tenets of speculative realism have long been features of systems
metaphysics and are expressed clearly in a systems framework.
Key words: realism, metaphysics, speculative realism, systems theory, systems metaphysics,
object-oriented ontology, difference
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Speculative Realism and Systems Metaphysics
A. Introduction: realism vs. human-centeredness
A new school of thought under the name “speculative realism” has recently emerged in
Continental philosophy that explicitly rejects its long-dominant anti-realism. This paper looks at
some salient ideas of this school from the perspective of systems theory.
Systems theory, a transdisciplinary project within science, is predominantly realist, but
includes also constructionist and other non-realist points of view. My own orientation as a
systems theorist has been realist, but I’ve been interested in the possible relevance to systems
theory of the thought of Continental philosophers such as Heidegger and Derrida. Speculative
realism marks a significant departure from these earlier thinkers, and I’m now reading The
Speculative Turn: Continental Realism and Materialism, edited by Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and
Graham Harman, a collection of articles from this community. I’m also reading Against
Continuity: Giles Deleuze’s Speculative Realism by Arjen Kleinherenbrink. Some ideas in these
books seem in accord with systems metaphysics. Reading the Speculative Turn makes it plain
that there is diversity of views within speculative realism, so I will take up here only themes
addressed by a few contributors to this book and by Kleinherenbrink’s interpretation of
Deleuze.
Speculative realists appear to be reacting to what they see as the prevailing anti-realist
or “human-centered” 1 orientation of Continental philosophy – as opposed to what might be
called the “world-centered” orientation that typifies science towards which analytic philosophy
is more aligned. The editors of this book describe the Continental tradition as follows:
“Humanity remains at the center of these works, and reality appears in philosophy only as the
correlate of human thought. In this respect phenomenology, structuralism, post-structuralism,
deconstruction, and postmodernism have all been perfect exemplars of the anti-realist trend in
Continental philosophy.” They contrast this approach with their own, noting that while
speculative realists obviously do not all agree on many issues, “…all of them, in one way or
another, have begun speculating once more about the nature of reality independently of
thought and of humanity more generally.” The phrase “human-centered” appears explicitly in
some individual essays in this book to characterize the orientation that is rejected.
Another way of expressing the relation between human- and world-centeredness is to
say that it maps onto the relation between epistemology and ontology. While one cannot
1

“Mind-centered” is an alternative to “human-centered.” Not all varieties of mind-centeredness are humancentered, but many are, and those that are not (e.g., absolute idealism) might be regarded as projections of a
human-centered view. Transcendental idealism – Kant and those he influenced – is plainly human-centered, and is
probably the primary target of speculative realism.
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completely separate ontology from epistemology, realists privilege ontology and anti-realists
privilege epistemology. Some Continental philosophers might claim not to be human-centered
and to be doing ontology, or at least that their philosophy is neutral with respect to these
distinctiona. For example, Heidegger’s Dasein is human-centered but Heidegger claimed to
have later moved away from human-centeredness. One might regard his notion of “Being” as a
neutral conception that transcends the dualism of human- vs. world-centeredness. The
Speculative Turn often characterizes the dominant position of Continental philosophy as
oriented towards the “correlation” of subject and object. But Heidegger didn’t move far from
human-centeredness, and in “correlationism” human-centeredness is clearly dominant. The
focus in this correlation is on human access to being, i.e., on epistemology. This is plain in Kant’s
view that the thing-in-itself is inaccessible, that all we have access to is the thing-for-us.
The title of the Speculative Turn book raises the question of the relation of realism to
materialism. Speculative realists differ on this. Graham Harman advocates “realism without
materialism." Other speculative realists, influenced by Marxism, regard realism and materialism
as synonymous.

B. Systems theory and the ontology-epistemology dichotomy
As a project within science, systems theory is aligned with world-centered realism, but there is
still a diversity of views about this within the systems community. My own view agrees with
that of Mario Bunge (1973), who characterized the systems project as an attempt to construct
an “exact and scientific metaphysics” (ESM), where “metaphysics” means a system of general
ideas applicable to many diverse phenomena, “exact” means expressed mathematically – at
least as an ultimate goal, and “scientific” means drawing upon and contributing to theories in
the sciences. This aim is realist but not positivist since it affirms a useful connection between
science and metaphysics.
Bunge explains the systems project with the epistemological hierarchy that is
summarized in Table 1 as a five-level hierarchy of inclusion on the left that is fused with a threelevel hierarchy of abstraction on the right.
Table 1 Epistemological hierarchy
Bunge’s terms are in brackets; he does not include (2), which is why it is indented.
E
M
(5) systems theory [generic semi-interpreted theory]
ESM
(4) theory [general theory]
S
(3) model [specific theory]
hierarchy of abstraction
(2) relation, law, hypothesis
(1) observables [model object]
hierarchy of inclusion
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Level (5), i.e., systems theory, is ESM. Above level (5), at the highest level of abstraction, E
refers to mathematics, which confers exactness on ESM; M refers to philosophy, specifically
metaphysics, which confers meaning and generality on ESM. Level (4) is aligned with S, whose
multiple lines represent multiple theories in the sciences. This conveys the idea that systems
theory draws upon and contributes to multiple scientific theories. ESM should actually also be
shown as multiple lines, since systems theory in the singular does not exist, but systems
theories in the plural abound; for example, network theory, information theory, automata
theory, nonlinear dynamics, feedback control theory, game theory, etc. Calling something a
“systems theory” doesn’t imply that the theory was developed by systems theorists, but rather
that it has transdisciplinary usefulness. For example, thermodynamics, a theory in physics, is
fundamental to systems ontology, so is here called a “systems theory.”
A model at level (3) is a linked set of relations at level (2) that apply a (general) theory at
level (4) to an empirical domain at level (1). For example, a model of the solar system is the
application of the theory of Newtonian mechanics to relations between the observable motions
of the planets and their satellites. Kepler discovered some of these relations empirically but
they were only comprehensible when derivable from Newton’s theory. Epistemologically, a
“system” is a model, but ontologically, a “system” is the reality referred to by the model. There
is an actual solar system independent of human thought. Models of the solar system represent
this actual system only approximately. For example, a Newtonian model of the solar system
ignores electromagnetism; a more accurate model would include it.

C. Core tenets of speculative realism
Let me summarize some tenets held by many, probably most, speculative realists.
1. Object. Many speculative realists advocate an “object oriented ontology” (OOO), where
objects are entities, things, beings. Deleuze, regarded by Kleinherenbrink (2020) as “both a
forerunner and a high point of what is called speculative realism, and more specifically of its
'object-oriented' branch,” calls them “assemblages” or “machines.” This object-centeredness
rejects prevailing attitudes in Continental philosophy which in turn were critical of earlier
philosophical positions. As Harmon (2010) observes, "… it is fascinating to note that almost
every available ‘radical’ option in philosophy has targeted objects as what most need to be
eliminated." But in this philosophical school the pendulum has swung back to objects.
Entities can be joined together to produce new entities. Kleinherenbrink (2020) notes,
"As Deleuze argues, each newly forged relation is itself immediately an irreducible machine."
The constituents of entities are likewise entities. Kleinherenbrink (2020) notes, "It is important
to note that the 'heterogeneous elements' constituting machines are simply more machines."
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2. Difference. For some speculative realists, difference plays an important role in this objectoriented ontology. For example, difference is central to Deleuze’s notion of being; more about
this in points 4 and 6 below.
3. Irreduction. The irreducibility of entities is asserted in an extreme way by Latour. Bryant et al
(2010a) write, “Against all forms of reduction to physical objects, cultural structures, systems
of power, texts, discourses, or phenomena in consciousness, Latour argues for an
‘irreductionism’ in which all entities are equally real (though not equally strong) insofar as they
act on other entities. While nonhuman actors such as germs, weather patterns, atoms, and
mountains obviously relate to the world around them, the same is true of Harry Potter, the
Virgin Mary, democracies, and hallucinations."2 For many speculative realists, physical entities
are not special, so entities are not restricted in type. Speculative materialists may not agree but
even for them there is no universal ground for entities.
4. Relation. For Deleuze relations are external to objects (Kleinherenbrink 2020). There are
multiple grounds for this “externality thesis”: (i) Involvement of an entity’s qualities in
particular relations is not obligatory. (ii) The qualities are separate from the external unity that
binds them together. (iii) The external aspect of the entity is supplemented by an internal
aspect that has no connection to these relations; this is elaborated upon in point 5. The
“relations” that are said here to be “external” are exterior. (Speculative realists rarely recognize
that entities also have interior relations.) They are “external” also in a second and different
sense: they are extrinsic (contingent) and not intrinsic (necessary) to entities and their qualities.
5. Internal Dimension. As Bryant et al (2010) write, “…nothing boils down to its relations.”
Entities are not solely defined in terms of their differences from or their relations with other
entities or differences in the qualities that mediate these relations. Rather, entities have an
interior dimension distinct from their exterior manifestations. Something internal is “withheld”
from all external relations with other entities. This calls to mind Kant’s distinction between
phenomena and noumena, but Kant’s distinction concerns the relation of subject and object
and establishes epistemological limits for the subject. For speculative realists, however, the
human subject has no special status. Limits apply also to object-object relations but these limits
are ontological, not epistemological: no object, interacting with another object, encounters the
full reality of the other object. This “withholding” of the interior from external manifestation,
i.e., from presence, also calls to mind Heidegger’s “concealing,” but for Heidegger what is
concealed is not an inside sealed off from the outside but the generative openness of
presencing itself (Donkel 2021). While one might expect that these “withheld” interior aspects

Other entities that speculative realists have mentioned in their lists include computer programs, zebras, apples,
conversations, keys, emotions, meteors.

2
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of entities are still linked in some way with their external qualities, some speculative realists
seem to regard such linkage as minimal or absent.
6. Unity. Entities have intrinsic unity and thus are discrete. In Deleuze’s fourfold ontology of
“machines” (and for him every entity is a “machine”), the external aspect of an entity is a
twofold, one term of which is unity and the other multiplicity. The internal aspect of an entity is
also a twofold, a unity and a multiplicity. The external twofold is “actual” and relational; the
interior twofold is “virtual” and non-relational. Deleuze calls the internal unity a “body without
organs” and characterizes it as indivisible, nondecomposable, unproductive, and ineffable
(Kleinherenbrink 89). 3 The external unity carries the multiplicity of qualities; the internal unity
separates this entity from other entities and assures it individuality.

D. Systems theory
Many core ideas of speculative realism have long been recognized in systems ontology. What
follows are systems equivalents of core ideas of speculative realism, noting also some
differences between systems metaphysics and speculative realism.
1. System. An object is a system. Systems ontology centers in the notion of “system,” which
means entity or object but can also mean process. The most common definition of “system” is a
set of elements and a set of relations that organize the elements (Hall and Fagen 1956). (Below,
“attributes” will be added to “elements” and “relations” to expand the definition of “system.”)
Every system is a Janus-faced duality: it is simultaneously a relation and an element. As a
relation, it organizes the system’s internal elements which are also systems (sub-systems) and
element-relation dyads. As an element, it can be part of an external supra-system, which is also
an element-relation dyad. Systemhood is mereological and is recursive or fractal.
2. Distinction. Difference, systems theoretically, is called distinction. The notion of “system”
encompasses two core ideas. One idea is distinction, exemplified in a fundamental way in the
basic distinction between system and environment. Distinction has the same meaning here as
difference, so difference is also fundamental to systems ontology. (The word “distinction”
should not be interpreted as implying a human-centered perspective.) In thermodynamic ideas
about system, difference means disequilibrium. The basis of the being of any systems inheres in
its disequilibrium with, i.e., its difference from, its environment. Disequilibrium is equally the
basis for becoming since it generates a drive towards equilibrium, which if not blocked yields a
process. The distinction between system and environment is external; distinction also applies
internally in that elements are distinct one from another, as are relations; see also point 5.

3

It is ironic that the “body without organs” essentially returns us to the inaccessibility of the noumenal, ironic
because it is precisely Kant’s human-centeredness that speculative realism rejects.
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3. Holism. Irreduction is holism. Systems theory is anti-reductionist. A system is a whole, a
“partial whole” (Murdoch 1992) to be exact, which is different than the “sum” of its parts.
Wholes can be anything, so this implies an “ontological parity” (Ross 1980) -- I call it
“ontological egalitarianism” – which rejects reductionism. While all systems are equally real,
one can still distinguish different types. Miller (1978), for example, divides systems into those
that are concrete, abstracted, and conceptual. Concrete systems are physical, and define the
domain of the natural sciences. Since the systems project is rooted in the sciences, much of
systems theory concerns concrete systems, and thermodynamics is fundamental for such
systems. Abstracted systems are physically instantiated but their physical aspects are not of
interest; they primarily define the domain of the social sciences. Network theory and game
theory are systems theories that apply to this domain, and networks and agents need not be
instantiated in any specific material way; in Bunge’s nomenclature (1973) they are “stuff free.”
The categories of information and utility are important for abstracted systems; neither have
physical units, in contrast with matter and energy which have physical units and are
fundamental to concrete systems. (Information is also applicable to concrete systems.)
Conceptual systems are not materially instantiated and include for example mathematics and
toothfairies. Since only some systems are material, and even material systems have immaterial
aspects, systems theory is realist but not materialist.
4. Function. Relations of the system with external entities define function. The systems view
partially supports the externality thesis. The second core idea of the notion of “system” is
order. The system participates in the exterior order of its environment. A system is an element
that carries (binds) its qualities, commonly referred to as attributes, through which it enters
into relations with other entities in its environment. Collectively, these relations are often
referred to as the system’s “function”; no connotation of purpose is intended by this word. But
relations also specify attributes. Attributes carried by the system and by possible external
relations need not coincide. (A round peg may not fit into a square hole.) This is a major theme
in Gestalt psychology, a field that has contributed to systems theory.
5. Structure. Internal dimension is structure. Order applies internally, and in fact interior order
is the basis of the definition of “system” given above: a set of elements and a set of internal
relations that organize the elements. These internal relations define the system’s “structure.” A
system is ordered as opposed to disordered. This interior order is thermodynamically expressed
by saying that systems normally have lower entropy than their environments. Usually structure
is viewed as constitutive, as what a system is while function is what a system does, but function
can be viewed as constitutive as well. Structure is no less relational than function, which follows
from the fractal/recursive character of systems; this would seem to differ from the nonrelationality that Deleuze posits for the inner character of entities.
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6. Unity. The unity of a system inheres in the fact that a set of relations can be integrated into a
single relation, which by the Janus principle is equivalent to a single element. Facing inwards, a
system is a unitary relation that organizes its constituent elements. Facing outwards, a system
is a unitary element that participates in the exterior order of the environment through relations
with other systems. These unities resemble the outer and inner unities in Deleuze’s fourfold.
The matter is more complex than this, since the system does not interact with its
environment only via its outer qualities. Rather, elements within the system can also be
involved, via their attributes, in relations with external elements. Systems theory denies the
hermetically sealed inner reality which seems to be posited by Deleuze. While structure is
usually partially concealed in function, nothing is absolutely and permanently immune to
environmental access. Kleinherenbrink (2020) writes, "Bryant holds that no entity ever directly
encounters the interior of another being." From a systems perspective this is an exaggeration.
It’s often or mostly true but not always true. X-rays encounter the inner structure of bodies.
The internal unity of a system can be expressed mathematically. If the single relation
representing the entire system cannot be fully decomposed without loss, then the system has
at least some non-decomposable unity. Some aspect of the system involves a relation of all of
its parts, and this aspect might metaphorically be spoken of as a “body without organs.” But if
internal unity is defined in this way, Deleuze’s characterization of this unity as unproductive
ignores the fact that it is from this internal unity that the external qualities of the system
emerge. And there is nothing ineffable about a non-decomposable relation; one can define
such a property mathematically. This said, most systems are in fact partially decomposable
(Simon 1981), so decomposition does not eliminate all order in the system.

E. Summary
Many tenets of speculative realism have long been asserted by systems theory. The school of
speculative realism would gain significantly from familiarity with the systems literature. 4 The
philosophical work of Mario Bunge is a good starting point. This is not to say that systems
metaphysics agrees with everything asserted by all speculative realists. It does not, but the
focus of this paper has been mainly to point to areas of agreement. This is also not to say that
systems theory has nothing to gain by familiarity with the literature of speculative realism.
Finally, commonalities between systems metaphysics and speculative realism illustrates clearly
that the systems project is engaged in constructing a ontology that connects not only to
mathematics and scientific theories but also to metaphysics, most recently to this new
Continental school.
4

One paper in the Bryant et al book (2010), that of DeLanda, reflects extensive familiarity with the systems
literature and explicitly addresses some systems themes, especially emergence. It bears primarily on Deleuze’s
notion of the “virtual,” and does not directly address issues discussed in this paper.
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